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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MRS. EDWARD WILSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

District Case No.

vs,

62999

FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION, REGION II
Defendant and Respondent.

Supreme Case No.
14 317

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County State of
Utah, the Honorable Calvin

Gould, District Judge.

The

order of the court denied Plaintiff's application for a
Temporary Restraining Order until a hearing could be held
upon Plaintiff's application for adoption of one Stephen Lacy.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Hearing upon Plaintiff!s Order to Show Cause why a
Temporary Restraining Order delaying placement of Stephen
Lacy until hearings could be held upon Plaintiff's petition
was held on August 12, 197 5 at which time the court took
the matter under advisement thereafter ordering on October
1, 1975 that Plaintiff's application for a Temporary
Restraining Order be denied.

Plaintiff filed its Notice of

Appeal, and the case is now before this Honorable Court
pursuant to that Notice of Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks for an overruling of the lower court's
decision and for an order reestablishing the Temporary
Restraining Order until the question of proper placement
be heard so that Appellant is afforded the proper due process
of law and that she be guaranteed an opportunity for review
by the district court of the placement decision of the Defendant.
Appellant further seeks an equal opportunity to that of
the undisclosed prospective parents selected by the Defendant
for placement to have the child's welfare and best interest
determined while in Appellant's custody so that at the time
her petition is heard by the court she too will qualify
under the statute as an adoptive parent.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mrs. Edward Wilson, is the
natural grandmother of Stephen Lacy, the minor child and the
subject of these proceedings, through his mother, Charlotte
Lacy, who is the natural daughter of the Appellant.

Charlotte

Lacy, who was charged with child abuse and aggravated, assault
on her son, Stephen Lacy, negotiated with the Davis County
Attorney's Office for voluntarily deprivation of her parental
rights to the son, Stephen Lacy, in consideration for the Davis
County Attorney's Office dropping the charges of aggravated
assault and child abuse against her.

By order of the Juvenile

Court of Davis County, the Defendant took custody of the said
minor child for the purposes of adoption.
Plaintiff applied for adoption of the said minor child
but was denied at which time Plaintiff filed a Temporary
Restraining Order to hold placement of the child in abeyance
until the matter of her application for adoption could be
reviewed by the District Court of Weber County State of Utah
and a hearing could be held wherein Plaintiff-Appellant
would be afforded the opportunity to put before the court
evidences of her fitness and capacity to more adequately
provide for the welfare of the child. (R. p. 18) Notwithstanding
Plaintiff's Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, the agency proceeded
to place the child out for adoption in violation of said order.
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Thereafter on August 12, 1975 a hearing was held on
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause why the Temporary Restraining
Order should not be continued until the matter could be
heard on its merits.

By its order of October 1, 1975 the

Weber County District Court denied to the Appellant Plaintiff
a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that the grandmother
had no standing beyond that of a third party petitioner in
the adoption. (R. p. 22) On October 22, 1975 Appellant filed her Notice
of Appeal and the case is now before this Honorable Court
pursuant to that Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 31)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY, DENIED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
WHEN IT FAILED TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
A HEARING, IN WHICH TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE, EXAMINE
AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND BE REPRESENTED
BY AN ATTORNEY.
After voluntarily depriving herself of parental?*rights
as the mother of Stephen Lacy in exchange for the dropping of
the aggravated assault and child abuse charges, the Defendant
took custody for the purposes of adoption by order of the
Juvenile Court of Davis County.

Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted

her application for the adoption of said Stephen Lacy along with
one other undisclosed prospective parent.

On June 30th, 1975
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the Defendant in committee decided to let the child out for
adoption to the undisclosed prospective parents thereby
denying to Plaintiff-Appellant her application without
affording her a hearing and the judicial processes necessary
to challenge the said committee's denial of her application.
On June 30th, 1975 Plaintiff had equal rights to those
of the selected prospective parents for placement of the
child.

She was entitled to due process of law including the

right to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to be represented by an attorney.

It is well

established by the landmark decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Goldberg vs. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1968) that
an agency can hardly be an impartial decision maker absent
the guarantees of due process as outlined above.

The United

States Supreme Court held by that case that administrative
agencies may not make judgments about the rights of persons
with whom they have agency obligations

without affording to

them the essential elements of due process of law.

While it

is true that agency adoption procedures have not been a fertile
field for litigation in this state and others, there have been
applications made of the Goldberg case to adoption agency
procedures.

See Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 25: 650 at

p. 683, the Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 26 Sept. 1974 p. 312,
and C.V.C. vs. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3rd 709, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 123 (1973).
-5-
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In C.V.C. v. Superior Court Supraf the court held that
the adoption agency may not terminate the placement of a
child for adoption without due process of law wherein the
"Cs" would be given a hearing, the right to introduce
evidence in their behalf, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and be represented by an attorney.
Two tests were applied in the C.V.C. case. First the
existence of immediate danger to the child may compell a
decision on the part of the adoption agency absent due process
requirements, but so long as the status quo is not dangerous,
due process requirements compell an evidentiary hearing.
Supra at p. 917, 919, and 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 130. The
second test is the determination of whether "grevious loss"
is threatened upon the moving party.

The Utah court has

recognized a parallel between the right to adopt.a child
and traditional property rights upon a showing that said
prospective adoptive parents have invested love and attachment
to the child.
A realistic appraisal of the situation compells
us to recognize that persons such as respondents
who have done what they have done for this child,
must be assumed to have affection and attachment
for her at least equally important to property
rights. Viewed in this light, there certainly
have intervened "vested" rights and respondents
have in reliance on representations made, placed
themselves in a different position...
In re
adoption of D, 122 Utah, 525, 252 P. 2nd, 223
(1953) at 535-36, 252 P. 2nd at 229.
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Accordingly Plaintiff in this action, as a grandmother having
done much for the child and invested much love "must be
assumed to have affection and attachment for" Stephen Lacy.
She has suffered a grevious loss of her grandchild and her
relationship with the said child.
Responding as timely as she did to be a candidate for
adoption, she had equal rights to those of the selected
family for the adoption of the minor child, Stephen Lacy.
Having denied Plaintiff's application for adoption, the
agency at that time should have been forced to submit to a
hearing in which evidence could be put on and a decision
made after the presentation of such evidence.

Further an

adverse decision against her should have been subject to a
judicial review.

See C.V.C. Supra.
POINT II.

THE STATUTE, UCA 78-30-14 (1953) (AS AMENDED),
IS EITHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR WAS APPLIED
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
AFFORDED EQUAL PROTECTION OF HER RIGHTS AS A
PETITIONER FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD,
STEPHEN LACY.
The Appellant may not file a petition for adoption in
this matter until she shall have had custody of the child for
at least six months prior to filing her adoption petition.
This becomes impossible after placement of the child.

-7-
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In the

vast bulk of adoptions handled by the district courts in
the State of Utah, the statute above functions and operates
very smoothly, but as applied to the facts in this case,
the said statute is either unconstitutional or was applied
unconstitutionally in that the Plaintiff-Appellant has not
been afforded equal protection of her rights as a contesting
petitioner for the adoption of a minor child, Stephen Lacy,
since the action of the Defendant effectively forecloses
her from an equal six-month period of custody and a comparable
study of her fitness and her environment as to whether or not
it would provide an equal or superior setting for the welfare
and benefit of the child.

Therefore, by the language of the

statute, the selected prospective family qualified but the
Appellant herein does not.
No petition for adoption shall be granted until
the child shall have lived for six months in the
home of the adopting parents... UCA 78-30-14(1953)
By the agency's placement of the child with a selected
prospective parent, there is only one set of parents which
may qualify to present their petition for adoption after a
six-month period.

To be equally protected under the law,

the Appellant should also be granted a six-month period
during which she could become qualified as an adoptive parent.
The said statute further provides that a report will be
made by the agency to the court setting forth the qualifications
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of the parent and specifically describing their fitness as
parents.

As a contesting prospective parent for the adoption

of a minor child, the Appellant is left with the dramatic
disadvantage in that all of the evidence placed before the
court will be positive on behalf of the family under investigation.

Conversely, the court and the agency will be

deprived of any comparable investigation or study of the
Appellant and her environment.
Under the Constitution of the United States, Amendment
XIV,
No state shall...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
In addition the Constitution of Utah in Article 1 Section 2
provides,
All political power is inherent in the people;
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit,
(emphasis added)
Laws which descriminate between persons of a particular
class have been found unconstitutional under this provision.
See Justice v. Standard Gibsonite Co., 12 Utah 2nd 357, 366
P. 2nd 974; Weber Basin Home Builder's Assn. v. Roy City, 26
Utah 2nd 215, 487 P. 2nd 866.
The adoption agency and the District Court of Weber
County State of Utah, in failing to halt the placement after

-9-
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having received notice of a contesting claim by the Appellant,
places the Appellant in a position of no standing to petition
the court for adoption, and effectively deprives her of any
adversary process for proving her superior ability and
environment to that of the selected family.

Nor can it be

refuted that once the agency has placed the child out for
adoption and makes a favorable report that the district
court will feel any compulsion to open the matter up for
consideration of Appellant's position because the district
courts consistently agree with agency recommendations.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING TO PLAINTIFF
A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROTECTING HER
AGAINST THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD UNTIL PROPER
HEARINGS COULD BE HELD AS TO PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY
TO ESTABLISH A HIGHER MEASURE OF BENEFIT TO THE
CHILD THAN THE BENEFITS THAT COULD BE PROVIDED
BY THE PROSPECTIVE PARENTS THAT WERE SELECTED
FOR PLACEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT.
At some point in time along the way towards the
adoption of Stephen Lacy, the Plaintiff or Appellant should
have been given the opportunity for a hearing.
In the case of C.V.C. v. Superior Court Supra, the
Superior Court refused to stay the enforcement of an order
terminating the placement of a child in another home whereupon
the child was in fact placed in another home.

-10-
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This was held

to be error by the appellant court as set forth above.
See p. 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131. Similarly, PlaintiffAppellant, Mrs. Edward Wilson, filed a Temporary Restraining
Order to hold placement of the child, Stephen Lacy, in
abeyance until the matter of Plaintiff's application for
adoption could be reviewed by the District Court of Weber
County State of Utah, and a hearing could be held wherein
the Appellant would be afforded the opportunity to put
before the court evidences of her fitness and capacity to
more adequately provide for the welfare of the child. (R. p. 14)
Not only did the adoption agency violate the said order by
placing the child out for adoption notwithstanding the
Restraining Order, but the court later dissolved the Temporary
Restraining Order and denied to Plaintiff-Appellant an order
on the Order to Show Cause which would effectively delay the
placement of said child until the matter could be fully
heard. (R. p. 22)
Now, at this point in time, much more evidence has been
gathered by the Defendant-Respondent to support the action
which they have already taken so that in any hearing that
would follow whether it were due to a contest on the petition
of the selected adoptive parent or a contest resulting from
a reversal by this Supreme Court followed by a hearing upon
Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint on file herein, Appellant will
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suffer a serious disadvantage with regard to her contest for
the adoption of Stephen Lacy.

The evidence gathered by the

said Defendant-Respondent will make said hearings unfair
and unjust as to the Appellant.

The only thing that can

offset the unfairness would be an opportunity given to the
Appellant herein to have a comparable and equal study made
during a six-month placement in Appellant's home.
A showing by the Defendant-Respondent that a hearing
before the adoption agency unduly burdens or inconveniences
the said agency or delays the proceedings herein is without
merit.

With regard to this a few observations are necessary.

First, administrative inconvenience must give way to individual
interests.

C.V.C., Supra at p. 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 123.

Appellant's intervention in this case constituted a mere
delay and if handled right would have resulted in only an
inconvenience.

Second, adoption agencies are not given carte

blanche in their control of relinquished children but must
be subject to scrutiny and inspection for flaws in their
decisions.

See Guardianship of Henwood, 49 Cal. 2nd 639, 644,

320 P. 2nd 1, 3-4 (1958).

The Henwood case held that there

are other methods of caring for a child during proceedings
other than placement when it is found that the adoption
procedure is not running its proper course.
care is one and a guardianship is another.
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Obviously foster

CONCLUSION
The power of the adoption agency is absolute and not
subject to scrutiny or inspection without a guarantee to an
interested person or competing prospective parents to
question and challenge their decision.

At least the said

agency is subject to due process sanctions in their decision
to deny to one prospective parent placement of the child for
adoption while granting said placement to another applicant
for the said adoption.

This principle is basic as a product

of the Goldberg v. Kelly case Supra.

In addition, the

statute and the application of the said statute in this
particular case has resulted in a situation where PlaintiffAppellant's petition for adoption will not even be considered
because she will not be afforded a six-month custody or
placement by the Defendant adoption agency.

The outcome is

an overwhelming and stark denial to the Appellant of the
constitutional protections of the United States Constitution
and the Utah Constitution.

To prevent such an unjust result

the Supreme Court should reverse the Weber County District
Court's Order of the 1st day of October 1975. (R. p. 22)
Respectfully,
-•"y7

Barnes
Attorney for Appellant
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Hutchinson, hereby certify that I served two
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